Had a good conversation with Bronwyn Bruton, the international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. I wanted to follow up with her letter to the NYT I commented on a few days ago.
The highlights:
- The pirates are essentially businessmen who have a good thing going. They don't want al-Qaeda around since their involvement would invite serious American retaliation. In fact, when pirates have been captured, they've been very clear that they aren't terrorists but are just pirates.
- Al-Shabab, an indigenous jihadist group with their eyes on government power, needs clan support to stay in power. So the clan in this case acts as a kind of check on al-Shabab. The clans, in turn, get a nice cut of the pirate ransoms that are doled out as part of the cost of doing business. It's a delicate balance - removing the pirate network removes a key source of income for clan leaders. Clan leaders would then be much more vulnerable to al-Shabab, which gets a lot of money from the Middle East.
- There are elements within al-Shebab who would welcome al-Qaeda with open arms. And links - albeit tenuous ones - already exist between the organizations. Upsetting the pirate network strengthens al-Shabab, which in turn opens the door to al-Qaeda in Somalia.
- There's some real concern that Somali emigres are coming back to the Somalia and being trained as terrorists. FBI testified to Congress about this concern, which seemed to be born out when it was discovered that one of the suicide bombers who was part of the 5-bomber attack in the Northern part of Somalia was an American citizen. Anything that further destabilizes the country creates a petri dish within which terrorism can flourish, grow, and eventually be exported.
- Complex connections exist between pirates and the al-Shabab. Though there've been rumors of cross-training and gun running between the organizations, the pirates and al-Shabab have generally been separate.
pirates
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